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According to the “romantic” tale of constitutional change 
(pp. 4, 34), our written Constitution created oh, so many years 
ago, establishes our most important and fundamental rights. 
Although we all agreed (by proxy) to these commitments 
originally, the majorities that inhabit the unruly political 
processes have a nasty tendency to go astray, and implement 
oppressive practices. In this case, it is up to the Justices, who 
reside up on high, to gallop in to save the day, interpreting real 
life meaning into the written words and casting aside injustices. 
But the Camelot of the Warren Court is no more. The Justices 
are acting more like anointed monarchs than white knights, 
refusing to engraft expanded rights for the disempowered onto 
the Constitution’s bare bones text, or worse—and increasingly 
frequently of late—reaching out under cover of its broadly 
worded provisions to invalidate specific and significant judg-
ments about distribution of private rights and use of public 
power reached, refined and embraced by democratic majorities 
across temporal and geographic boundaries and in spite of 
apparent ideological divides. Much of the legal academy has 
been wringing its collective hands for years now. Things have 
reached such a state that big thinkers such as Dean Larry 
Kramer and Professor Mark Tushnet have predicted the loss of 
“We the People” popular sovereignty, and called for stripping 
constitutional review power from the Court, respectively.4 In 
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their new book, A Republic of Statutes, William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
and John Ferejohn add to this lively conversation of how 
constitutional change does and should occur. Although they 
characterize their theory of constitutionalism as “radical” (p. 26), 
in actuality they counsel a less dramatic response to the pesky 
problem of activist review by unelected judges: Don’t pay so 
much attention, and maybe they’ll stop acting out.  
I 
Eskridge and Ferejohn present a “nontraditional frame-
work for thinking about American constitutionalism” (p. 1). In 
the traditional framework, the Constitution is great, judges are 
good, and the actors in the political process are the shifty and 
unprincipled bad guys, who must constantly be monitored lest 
they misbehave. By contrast, the Eskridge/Ferejohn framework 
puts the democratic process and the political actors who operate 
within it front-and-center in their explanation of how the really 
important rights and liberties that impact and improve the lives 
of real people today get made. While traditionalists avert their 
gaze from interest groups, politicians, administrative bureaucrats 
and the haphazard, cobbled-together products that they tend to 
create, the book’s authors stare with undisguised relish. For 
Eskridge and Ferejohn, the hurly burly, nitty gritty, back-and-
forth of day-to-day politics is something to celebrate. In the 
authors’ small-“c” constitutionalism, the products of the political 
process—statutes, regulations, treaties—are the key texts; 
legislators, executive officials and legislators, the government 
actors with the primary power to establish what the words mean; 
and judges, the ones who must be watched most carefully lest 
they fail to recognize the fundamentality and legitimacy of the 
norms that We the People make, as we act alone, or in com-
binations, through our elected representatives, and in a host of 
other messy but meaningful kinds of ways. 
The authors present the specifics of their theory in the first 
part of the book through a string of trilogies, which multiply and 
repeat with the insistency of a Power Point slide show. 
Democratic constitutionalism requires (1) “popular choice of 
political leaders,” (2) a “normative hierarchy embodying sub-
stantive rights,” and (3) “institutions and procedures for 
enforcing the hierarchy and at least some of the rights” (p. 2). 
 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000). 
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Our written Constitution, augmented by the Bill of Rights, 
accomplished these things. But the words are vague, and the 
dramatically difficult Article V amendment process means that 
the primary vehicle for constitutional change cannot be 
deliberation and decision by We the People, through our many 
and diverse elected representatives. Instead, constitutional 
updating must be accomplished through interpretation and 
pronouncement by unelected judges. 
Three problems plague our judge-enforced big-“C” 
Constitution. First, the Justices are not institutionally situated to 
duplicate the legitimacy of the impractical constitutional 
amendment process, the accuracy or wisdom of the judgment 
reached, or effective enforcement of the result. Second, the 
norms of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court, do not 
apply directly to private action. Because of their limited 
application, judge-interpreted constitutional rights cannot 
change the behaviors that most harm the disadvantaged or 
penetrate deeply into popular culture to change hearts and 
minds. Third, the Constitution’s scant text does not obviously 
impose duties on governments to create and guarantee the 
conditions that allow all of the nation’s citizens, whatever their 
particular characteristics or circumstances, to live productive and 
fulfilling lives (pp. 4–5). 
These three “huge limitations” of big-“C” Constitutionalism 
have channeled the American people toward the small-“c” 
constitutionalism of defining and refining rights and liberties 
through legislative and administrative actions. In the “republic 
of statutes” that the authors describe, new, and potentially 
positive, rights commitments are made through the political 
process. They may be fleeting or, according to the small-“c” 
constitutional process, they may achieve “super” status, which 
means that, like big-“C” Constitutional norms, they are more 
fundamental and enduring than ordinary law. 
The authors advance three themes about the interaction of 
small-“c” “super” constitutional products of the democratic 
processes with big-“C” Constitutional norms (pp. 6–24). First, 
political process products transform Constitutional baselines 
(pp. 6–7). Eskridge and Ferejohn distinguish the terse big-“C” 
Constitution from the voluminous and dense products of the 
political process—statutes, regulations, treaties and executive 
orders—that together form the “working constitution,” which 
primarily structures how we live, interact and achieve our life 
possibilities these days. They argue that these products not only 
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fill in the gaps in a document that provides few specifics relevant 
to today, but that they are created through a governance process 
that transcends that which the Constitution created. Specifically, 
agencies now regulate much of what we do day-to-day. 
Additionally, state law still structures many of the basic ground 
rules of core institutions, such the market and family. In these 
many ways, political actors and the products they create, not 
judges interpreting Constitutional rights, define and refine core 
norms of public morality. The authors argue further, pointing to 
the example of the desegregation obligations imposed by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, that norms created by statute may 
influence the public’s perception of the scope of Constitutional 
rights, may improve the actual material enjoyment by litigants of 
their adjudicated Constitutional rights and may also impact the 
Court’s subsequent interpretations of those same Constitutional 
rights. 
The authors’ second theme is that structures and norms 
created through the ordinary political processes may become 
“entrenched” so that they operate with a force akin to big-“C” 
Constitutional norms (pp. 7–8). Here, the authors refer to the 
distinction drawn in Max Weber’s theory of power, between that 
which is based on the authority to command and that which is 
based on the force of social norms. They claim that laws typically 
operate within both of these spheres. They acknowledge that 
big-“C” Constitutional norms have greater authority to 
command, because, according to the text of the Supremacy 
Clause, they trump small-“c” constitutional norms. They argue, 
however, that some norms created through the political process 
acquire “super” power within the social sphere, which means 
that they are more resistant to change than ordinary products of 
the political process and able to exert force to influence behavior 
beyond their formal legal boundaries. 
And the authors press their point further. In this republic of 
statutes, which they assert that this nation has become, the 
political process is not only another route through which 
fundamental norms become identified and adopted by the polity, 
it is the only way that really works these days (p. 14). The 
political process works better than constitutional amendment or 
judicial pronouncement at establishing and entrenching public 
norms because it presents the possibility for republican 
deliberation. The authors set out another three-factor test to 
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identify the type of deliberation they mean,5 but, most basically 
what they are talking about are legal norms that have emerged 
after the back-and-forth of active engagement with them by 
many political actors over the course of time.6 Three types of 
sub-constitutional law have the potential to undergo the 
republican deliberation necessary to achieve “super” status. 
These are (1) state statutory convergences, (2) “ambitious” 
federal statutes, and (3) transnational agreements and 
conventions (p. 16). 
With respect to federal statutes in particular, enactment in 
response to popular demand is only the beginning. The process 
of entrenchment through implementation is crucial to tapping 
into the deeper, social norm source of power. The entrenchment 
process usually involves a three-step process. First, the statute’s 
supporters and its administrators must figure out how to 
implement it effectively, creating evidence that progress has 
been made. Second, application of the statute must avoid the 
disasters predicted by opponents, and, better yet, produce gains 
that win them over. Third, implementation of the statute must 
expand its constituency. After a subsequent Congress reaffirms 
what the first one did, modifying the norm or its applications as 
appropriate in light of the lessons learned through adminis-
tration, an emerging superstatute comes of age. According to 
Eskridge and Ferejohn, the small-“c” “constitutional” process of 
superstatute norm entrenchment is superior to that which can be 
achieved through the big-“C” process of Constitutional change 
for three (yes, three) reasons. Superstatute entrenchment is 
“institutional, but without the rigid supermajority requirements 
imposed by Article V;” it is “deliberative, but with the process 
focused on agencies and legislatures rather than courts;” and it is 
“popular, but with feedback occurring over time” rather than in 
one big Constitutional showdown (p. 17). 
With their third claim, Eskridge and Ferejohn describe what 
they see as the “productive role” unelected judges can continue 
to occupy in this brave new republic of statutes that they identify 
(p. 22). It is “modest,” to be sure, but provides a “conceptual 
payoff” nevertheless (p. 434). According to their theory of small-
“c” constitutionalism, deliberation in the democratic process, 
 
 5. Republican deliberation must be purposive, dialogic, and accountable to 
stakeholders (p. 15). 
 6. The authors describe the political process as the “gradual process of legislation, 
administrative implementation, public feedback, and legislative reaffirmation and 
elaboration” (p. 14). 
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over the course of time and in numerous venues is what 
identifies new fundamental norms and cements them, and so the 
authors argue that the Court should look to this deliberation to 
guide its big-“C” Constitutional interpretations. Indeed, they say 
it is “high time” other legal theorists saw things this way, too (p. 
435). The authors counsel that judicial review should above all 
be deliberation-respecting, which means the state and national 
deliberative processes should have “significant normative force” 
when judges evaluate the constitutionality of its products (laws 
and policies) and where those processes have occurred, the 
Court generally should defer.7 As compared to original meaning 
theories of interpretation, Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that 
their deliberation-respecting theory provides a more objective 
and democratically responsive method for judges to apply 
ambiguous Constitutional text to modern problems. They argue 
that judges ought to treat norms that have achieved “super” 
status as precedents, to be studied and presumptively applied to 
interpret ambiguous Constitutional text (pp. 444–55). 
The three parts of the book, each divided into three 
chapters, present detailed “case”—or, rather, “statute”—studies 
through which the authors illustrate, explain and defend their 
themes. In Part I, the authors present their theory of small-“c” 
constitutionalism.8 They present the history of three major 
statutes, which they argue have achieved the “super” status. 
These are the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, and the Sherman Act of 1890. The authors 
use these examples to illustrate “norm entrepreneurship” by 
legislative and executive officials (as opposed to judges), the 
legitimating deliberation that occurs over time and at many 
locations in the political process, and the power of superstatute 
norms to curve legal and social space-time so that they impact 
behaviors beyond their formal legal commands. 
The chapters in Part II address the process of small-“c” 
constitutional entrenchment. The examples include the Social 
Security Act of 1935, state statutory convergences in the areas of 
marriage and family, and the “green constitution” as embodied 
 
 7. When Congress has failed to deliberate appropriately, judicial review should be 
deliberation-inducing, which means the Court uses a “soft” means of rebuke, such as 
statutory interpretation, to send the issue back for the deliberation that was supposed to 
have occurred (p. 24). 
 8. They also call this process “administrative constitutionalism,” with the 
explanation that the more accurate label of “congressional-presidential-administrative 
constitutionalism” would be too long (p. 26). 
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in the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act. The 
authors present pages and pages of bills, laws, amendments, 
regulations, and political gains and setbacks to defend their 
claim that through this arduous, and often tedious, process, 
institutions and norms established by statutes and regulations 
achieve a durability that is analogous to the “entrenchment” that 
the written text of the Constitution and judicial interpretations 
of it enjoy. Importantly, Eskridge and Ferejohn acknowledge 
that some features of the written Constitution, like its 
bicameralism requirement for enactment of legislation, are 
entrenched more deeply than norms created through the 
political process can ever be. They claim, however, that the 
“super” norms that emerge from the political process gauntlet 
that they describe are more entrenched than ordinary legislation 
and a number of judicially interpreted Constitutional rights (p. 
165). In the chapter about the environmental statutes, in 
particular, the authors make a number of points about judicial 
review of agency action. Most basically, they argue that agency 
interpretation of federal superstatutes will inevitably be 
dynamic, and the Court should most often let it happen, so long 
as it is evident that deliberation occurred.9 In fact, and 
“[r]eflecting current practice,” the Court should “openly 
announce deliberation as a plus factor in judicial review” (p. 
265). 
Part III presents examples to illustrate small-“c” 
constitutionalism’s “great virtue” of adaptability. These 
examples are the various laws establishing rules relating to 
money and banking, homosexuality and national security. The 
authors label this part as presenting cycles of constitutional 
entrenchment and dis-entrenchment. With respect to the first 
two examples, they present histories to demonstrate successful 
dis-entrenchment of an entrenched small-“c” constitutional 
norm (the United States Banks and the “anti-homosexual 
constitution,” respectively). With respect to national security, 
they argue that the Bush-Cheney innovations relating to 
wiretapping and waterboarding were attempted dis-
entrenchments that did not stick. Although they promote small-
“c” constitutionalism as better than its big-“C” alternative, in 
 
 9. Specifically, the authors argue that “the best role for judicial review to play in 
the modern administrative state is to be deliberation-inducing as to normative agency 
judgments.” This means that the Court should defer when an agency has engaged in 
“model deliberation,” and not defer when an agency’s interpretation “comes out of 
nowhere,” or otherwise suggests that the agency did not fully consider its result (p. 265). 
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this part they acknowledge that administrators charged with 
developing “super” norms can “go[] off track.” (p. 305). In these 
chapters, they provide examples of administrators’ missteps, and 
identify potential checks. Although all three branches possess 
the power to impose limits on renegade agency action, Eskridge 
and Ferejohn identify the judiciary as “exceedingly important” 
in this respect, identifying limits set by state and federal judges 
on aggressive anti-homosexual policies and on “the adminis-
trative culture of torture” as good deeds done (pp. 307–08). 
II 
The Republic of Statutes is a big book, which adds value at a 
number of levels to the discussion of how the most fundamental 
commitments that inhabit our laws become made and evolve. 
One is as history, and it is this that is most difficult to present in 
a summary. The information jam-packed into the book’s many 
chapters—the ideas, the personalities, the connections that the 
authors make among activities happening at different times and 
in different places—is fresh and interesting. It does not hurt, of 
course, that the examples recount histories that readers have 
lived through, perhaps participated in, and that sprinkled 
through the text are names of people readers are likely to have 
met or know. But that the book is relevant is hardly a criticism. 
Not everyone is going to agree with the claims the authors make 
about small-“c” constitutionalism and its authority to rival big-
“C” Constitutional norms in life and law. But all readers are 
going to learn something, and be provoked to reconcile their 
own assumptions about how “fundamental” law is formed with 
the very plausible claims that Eskridge and Ferejohn make. 
The book is also inspiring. These authors make heroes out 
of career politicians and bureaucrats. How unexpected is that? 
Although its story of change through the courts is their 
antithesis, many of the book’s separate stories evoke a feel-good 
Road to Brown glow.10 The authors personalize their accounts 
from the get-go by introducing real people, with names and life 
circumstances, who need the law changed. They then present 
more real people—private activists, legislators, administrators—
who took action to get the job done. Their focus is not on 
corruption, capture, partisanship, and road blocks (although they 
 
 10. THE ROAD TO BROWN (University of Virginia 1989) (depicting the work of 
Charles Hamilton Huston and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund that led to the decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education).  
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mention these things). They think government is good and the 
lawmaking process, by and large, works. The accounts are not all 
happy talk, but the authors’ overall theme of incremental change 
achieved through hard work and persistence applied through the 
established structures of governance is on the rosy side of the 
spectrum of opinions likely to be offered these days.  
Eskridge and Ferejohn are going to lose some readers when 
they talk about entrenchment. It is a tricky term to use to 
describe products of the ordinary democratic process when it is 
the quality that usually distinguishes more fundamental 
“Constitutional” law from those things. The fact is that 
“entrenched” means “more difficult to change than ordinary 
law,” and even the most super of superstatutes can be modified 
or repealed by the same processes (set out in Article I) as the 
lowliest of laws. The authors explain that they mean social, not 
formal, legal, entrenchment. The question then becomes: what is 
important about that? 
In arguing that the social entrenchment of fundamental 
norms is highly important, the authors succeed to the extent 
their ambitions are descriptive. It seems obvious that, given the 
few words in the Constitution, many of the important norms that 
structure how people live and interact day-to-day will appear in 
statutes, and in regulations that refine them. It is not much of a 
stretch to go further along with the authors to acknowledge that, 
with respect to many of these norms, a majority of active voters 
will grow accustomed to them, embrace them as appropriate (for 
a variety of reasons), and not seek to change them significantly. 
It also seems likely that these new norms will influence 
behaviors outside their formal legal ambit, causing unregulated 
people to conform their conduct out of social pressure, spawning 
new laws that build on the new norm, or influencing how judges 
choose to interpret big-“C” Constitutional provisions. This chain 
of events that defines small-“c” constitutionalism is interesting 
and adds to the understanding of the role of statutes and 
products of the political process more generally in influencing 
the creation and evolution of fundamental norms.  
The authors’ claim that judges, and the Justices in 
particular, should identify entrenched norms embodied in 
“super” products of the democratic process and use them to 
guide their constitutional decision making, is a tougher sell. It is 
one thing to look backwards and to claim that some products of 
the democratic process have established “super” norms, which 
have had the outside-their-formal-legal-boundaries influences 
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that the authors claim. It is another, and much more difficult 
thing to claim that these “super” norms can be identified—
objectively—and applied to modern problems as both the norms 
and the problems are evolving. 
Reasonable people are going to disagree about what 
amount of time passage or back-and-forth deliberation makes a 
statute “super” and what the level of generality of reading the 
norm should be. As to the latter point, the authors argue that 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in District of Columbia v. 
Heller,11 purporting to rely on “original meaning” to interpret the 
Second Amendment to guarantee a limited right to possess hand 
guns in the home, could more legitimately have justified its 
result based on state and federal laws that regulated guns 
generally, but consistently failed to restrict gun possession for 
hunting or self-defense (pp. 438–42). So now it is super-silence 
we are talking about? To be fair, the authors’ evidence of how 
their theory of judicial review is superior to the variations 
offered by originalists is much richer than can be presented here, 
and they offer their theory as a better justification for a result 
that they do not embrace. Nevertheless, the gymnastics required 
to explain the application of their theory in this example 
undermine their claim that an objective and predictable method 
exists to identify “super” norms. 
Reasonable people will also disagree about the 
circumstances under which a “super” state law convergence 
should be interpreted to occur. The authors argue that the 
Court’s unanimous decision in Loving v. Virginia12 was a correct 
application of small-“c” constitutionalism, because “all but 
sixteen states” had repealed their miscegenation laws (and these 
were largely in the South) (p. 448). As another example, they 
argue that both the decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick13 and 
Lawrence v. Texas14 were appropriate because in 1986 (Bowers) 
twenty-four states still criminalized sodomy (p. 363), whereas in 
2003, that number had dropped to fifteen (p. 368). Huh? Again, 
the authors offer detailed evidence that cannot be presented 
here to support their claims. They point to changes in “public 
 
 11. 554 U.S. 570 passim (2008). 
 12. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that miscegenation statutes violate the Due 
Process Clause). 
 13. 478 U.S. 186, 198 (1986) (holding that a state anti-sodomy statute does not 
violate fundamental rights). 
 14. 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (overruling Bowers and holding that a state anti-
sodomy statute did violate fundamental rights). 
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opinion” and in other democratic process arenas, and seem to 
rely as well upon momentum to support their determination that 
a “super” state law convergence has occurred. But if change is 
happening, it would seem that the democratic processes are 
working, which is what the authors prefer. Absent dramatic and 
systemic blockages impeding fair deliberation in the political 
process (which is what the authors find to be the “best defense” 
of the Court’s aggressive norm pronouncement in Brown v. 
Board of Education15 (p. 456)), deliberation-respecting review 
would seem to require that the Court defer. At the very least, 
the tipping point for state statutory convergences is not obvious. 
Unfortunately, but predictably, the indeterminacy creates the 
same possibility for selective and result-oriented application of 
small-“c” constitutionalism as exists with the originalist theories 
it is advanced to replace. 
***** 
Eskridge and Ferejohn conclude their book by offering a 
gardening metaphor. In the “dominant discussion,” rights are 
static, locked inside a document, made by others and for others 
to apply. For the book’s authors, however, the fundamental 
norms we live by are like plantings, alive and in need of tending. 
Not everyone will embrace the imagery. It does, however, 
suggest an axiom that aptly captures the message the authors 
want to convey: Better to reap what you sow, than be told what 
to grow. The Justices are unlikely to listen. But they are bit 
players, after all, in the ongoing drama Eskridge and Ferejohn 
describe. We the People occupy the lead roles. Maybe their 
message will germinate. 
 
 
 15. 347 U.S. 483, 496 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public education 
violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
